The juxtaposition of established signal detection theory models of perception and more recent claims about the encoding of uncertainty in perception is a rich source of confusion. Are the latter simply a rehash of the former? Here, we make an attempt to distinguish precisely between optimal and probabilistic computation. In optimal computation, the observer minimizes the expected cost under a posterior probability distribution. In probabilistic computation, the observer uses higher moments of the likelihood function of the stimulus on a trial-by-trial basis. Computation can be optimal without being probabilistic, and vice versa. Most signal detection theory models describe optimal computation. Behavioral data only provide evidence for a neural representation of uncertainty if they are best described by a model of probabilistic computation. We argue that single-neuron activity sometimes suffices for optimal computation, but never for probabilistic computation. A population code is needed instead. Not every population code is equally suitable, because nuisance parameters have to be marginalized out. This problem is solved by Poisson-like, but not by Gaussian variability. Finally, we build a dictionary between signal detection theory quantities and Poisson-like population quantities.
Introduction
''The [authors state] that the encoding of an animal's uncertainty is the key point distinguishing models encoding probability distributions from those encoding estimates. Wrong. Signal detection theory has been used for decades to correlate an animal's performance with the degree to which neurons discriminate between alternative choices. [. . .] The idea is that the animal can no better discriminate between alternative choices than can an ideal observer observing the neurons representing those choices. The neural responses are often well correlated by this measure with the animal's performance, including when the animal gets it less than 100% right, which represents uncertainty. So the encoding of uncertainty, either explicitly or implicitly in the less-than-perfect discriminability of the activities of populations representing alternatives, provides no evidence for [computation with probability distributions]." -Anonymous reviewer, 2009
In the past 50 years, signal detection theory has been used extensively to model human and animal perception (e.g., Burgess, 1985; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Peterson, Birdsall, & Fox, 1954) . Typically applied to binary (two-alternative) decisions, the central idea is that an observer computes the log posterior ratio of two alternatives, and compares its value to a criterion to make a decision. Observer errors arise from the variability (also called noise) in the observations used to compute the log posterior ratio. As the quoted reviewer points out, it is now standard practice to use signal detection theory to quantify the discrimination performance of a neuron (Bradley, Skottun, Ohzawa, Sclar, & Freeman, 1987; Britten, Shadlen, Newsome, & Movshon, 1992; Newsome, Britten, & Movshon, 1989; Parker & Newsome, 1998) .
A more recent development is the application of Bayesian modeling to cue combination (Clark & Yuille, 1990; Knill & Richards, 1996) . While signal detection theory is also Bayesian, the novelty here is that the optimal observer weights observations (cues) by their respective reliabilities when combining them. Humans (Alais & Burr, 2004; Battaglia, Jacobs, & Aslin, 2003; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Jacobs, 1999; Knill, 1998a Knill, , 1998b Knill & Richards, 1996; Knill & Saunders, 2003; Landy, Maloney, Johnston, & Young, 1995; Ma, Zhou, Ross, Foxe, & Parra, 2009; Reuschel, Drewing, Henriques, Roesler, & Fiehler, 2010; van Beers, Sittig, & Denier van der Gon, 1996; van Beers, Sittig, & Gon, 1999) and monkeys (Gu, Angelaki, & DeAngelis, 2008) follow the predictions of the optimal cue combination model rather closely. Human near-optimality has also been found in other perceptual tasks, including visual speed discrimination (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006) , the cueing task (Shimozaki, Eckstein, & Abbey, 2003) , visuomotor learning (Kording & Wolpert, 2004) , causal inference (Kording et al., 2007) , visualmemory integration (Brouwer & Knill, 2007) , oddity detection (Hospedales & Vijayakumar, 2009) , tactile trajectory perception (Goldreich, 2007) , combining sensory information with reward (Whiteley & Sahani, 2008) , and visual search (Ma, Navalpakkam, Beck, & Pouget, 2008b; Palmer, Verghese, & Pavel, 2000; Vincent, Baddeley, Troscianko, & Gilchrist, 2009 ).
Weighting observations by reliability requires knowledge of reliability, which can be regarded as a property of a probability distribution over the stimulus. Therefore, the above psychophysical findings are often regarded as support for theoretical (Anastasio, Patton, & Belkacem-Boussaid, 2000; Anderson, 1994; Barlow, 1969; Deneve, 2008; Fiser, Berkes, Orban, & Lengyel, 2010; Foldiak, 1993; Hoyer & Hyvarinen, 2000; Jazayeri & Movshon, 2006; Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006; Pouget, Dayan, & Zemel, 2003; Sanger, 1996; Zemel, Dayan, & Pouget, 1998) and neurophysiological (Gu et al., 2008; Kepecs, Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Morgan, DeAngelis, & Angelaki, 2008; Yang & Shadlen, 2007) investigations of the neural encoding of probability or uncertainty in perceptual decision-making.
Here, we offer a cautionary tale. In many instances, Bayesian near-optimality does not provide evidence for a neural representation of probability, reliability, or uncertainty. Only when a psychophysics experiments satisfies a number of requirements does such evidence exist. While the majority of signal detection theory studies do not provide evidence for computation with probability distributions, the quoted reviewer was incorrect in stating that observers in those models still possess an implicit encoding of uncertainty by virtue of not performing perfectly. Conversely, it is possible that an observer's behavior is best described by a suboptimal model and still provides evidence for a neural representation of uncertainty.
Neural representation of uncertainty: psychophysical evidence
We first review the probabilistic approach to perceptual modeling. For simplicity, we assume that only one feature dimension is relevant, e.g., orientation or motion direction. The variables specifying this dimension across all stimuli are denoted by s. This could be a vector or a scalar, depending on how many stimuli there are; we will mostly use the singular ''stimulus" for convenience. Sensory input is generated from s, but also depends on other variables that determine stimulus reliability, such as luminance contrast or size in an orientation judgment task. We denote these nuisance parameters by h. In natural environments, they typically change across time. Sensory input, also called the proximal stimulus or the observation, is denoted I; in a visual task, it could be the retinal image. I is generated from s and h through a stochastic process, reflecting various sources of noise. Therefore, it varies from trial to trial even when s and h are held fixed. This process can be formalized as a conditional probability distribution, p(I|s, h).
The likelihood function of the stimulus
All information that an observer receives about the stimulus and the nuisance parameters on a single trial is contained in the likelihood function, defined as L I ðs; hÞ ¼ pðIjs; hÞ:
The most important thing to keep in mind about this likelihood function is that its arguments, s and h, are not physical variables controlled by the experimenter, but variables that describe hypotheses in the mind of the observer. The probability assigned to them is also called degree of belief (Ramsey, 1926) . To obtain the likelihood function of the stimulus alone, we have to marginalize out the nuisance parameters, since they are unknown (Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Peterson et al., 1954) 
where p(h) is the prior over nuisance parameters (which could in principle depend on s, but usually is assumed not to). The likelihood is not a probability distribution, since it is not normalized. We denote its normalized version by L Ã I ðsÞ. Because I varies from trial to trial, the (normalized) likelihood does as well (Fig. 1a) . It can be parametrized through its moments. For example, if it is a onedimensional Gaussian, then it is uniquely specified by its mean 
where the notation indicates that the ''summary statistics" x and r 2 are functions of I. When there are multiple stimuli, s and x are vectors and r 2 is replaced by a covariance matrix. The mean x is a point estimate of the stimulus, sometimes also called the internal representation of the stimulus, the observation, or the measurement. Since for a Gaussian, the mean equals the mode, x(I) is also the maximum-likelihood estimate of the stimulus based on I. The variance r 2 (I) is a measure of the uncertainty about the stimulus (which we will also call ''stimulus uncertainty", not to be confused with overlapping class distributions in classification). Like x, it varies from trial to trial because I does. I in turn varies because the underlying true stimulus and nuisance parameters, s true and h true , vary, but also because for given s true and h true , I is drawn from a probability distribution. A common approximation to the effect of this stochasticity is that it only affects the mean, x, but not the variance r 2 (I) (see Fig. 1b ). In that case, variance is simply a function of s true and h true , which we denote r 2 (s true , h true ). We use the label ''true" to distinguish experimentally controlled variables from the unlabeled variables s and h, which indicate hypotheses considered by the observer, as in Eq. (1).
Estimation
Suppose an observer has to estimate a world-state variable C; this could be a physical feature of the stimulus or a more abstract variable, such as target presence in visual search. C can be binary, multi-valued, or continuous. For given input I, the observer's estimate of C is denoted b C . The estimate follows a probability distribution, pð b C jIÞ. If the estimator is deterministic, the estimate can be written as a function of I, b C ¼ FðIÞ, and the distribution pð b C jIÞ is given by a delta function. If the Gaussian form of the stimulus likelihood, Eq. (2), is used, then the estimate is a function of x and r 2 , b C ¼ Fðx; r 2 Þ. Since I is the noisy sensory input on a single trial, it is not directly accessible to the experimenter. Therefore, of interest is commonly the probability of b C predicted by the model over many trials, in a particular experimental condition given by s and h. This is obtained by marginalizing over I:
All measures of model observer performance can be computed from this estimate distribution.
Optimal inference
An optimal observer estimates C based on the posterior probability distribution over C given sensory input I on a single trial. This distribution, p(C|I), quantifies the observer's degree of belief in all possible values of C. On each trial, the posterior is computed by combining the likelihood function, L I (s), with other, task-specific probability distributions. This is done according to the rules of 1 Here is an everyday example of marginalization: suppose you know for each province P in a country the proportion of farmers, p(F|P), and the proportion of the country's population living in the province, p(P). Then the proportion of farmers in the entire country, p(F), is a weighted average of the province-specific proportions, with the weights given by the proportions of the country's population in each province: p(F)=R P p(F|P)p(P).
probability calculus and the structure of the generative model, i.e., the set of probability distributions through which observations are generated (see the examples below). A typical generative model is shown in Fig. 2a . The optimal way to read out the posterior depends on the cost function; one way is the maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) estimate:
where argmax is the operation of finding the value (here of C) for which the expression following it is maximized.
Example 1 (Classification). In classification, a stimulus s is drawn from one of several classes, characterized by probability distributions p(s|C), where C is the class label (Fig. 2a) . The observer has learned these distributions and has to decide on each trial which class the stimulus was drawn from. Then the posterior probability distribution over C is calculated as pðCjIÞ ¼ pðIjCÞpðCÞ pðIÞ
Most signal detection theory models describe binary classification. If we choose the values of C to be ±1, then the MAP estimate is the sign of the log posterior ratio (Green & Swets, 1966) ,
Detection and discrimination are special cases of classification; in some classification tasks, such as same-different judgment, more than one stimulus might be present at the same time.
Example 2 (Cue combination, estimation task). In cue combination, an observer receives two conditionally independent sensory inputs, I 1 and I 2 , generated by the same stimulus s. The world-state variable C is s itself. The posterior is (Clark & Yuille, 1990) 
ðsÞpðsÞds : (Fig. 1c) . When likelihoods are Gaussian (Eq. (2)) and the prior is flat, the MAP estimate isŝ ¼
. This expression has been tested in many psychophysical studies. Example 3 (Homogeneous visual search, yes/no task). In visual search with homogeneous distractors with a fixed value, an observer detects whether a target stimulus with value s T is present (C = 1) or absent (C = À1) among N stimuli s 1 , . . . , s N , with corresponding sensory inputs I 1 , . . . , I N . Distracters have a value s D . We make the assumption that nuisance parameters are uncorrelated across locations, which is unrealistic in natural scenes. At each location, a likelihood L I,i (s i ) = p(I i |s i ) is computed (Fig. 1d) . When the prior probability of target presence equals ½, the log posterior ratio is ( (Peterson et al., 1954) , Eq. 162):
where the last equality holds when likelihoods are Gaussian (Eq.
(2)). Here too, x i is weighted by 1=r 2 i . When distractors are heterogeneous, integrals like the one in Eq. (4) appear.
In all examples, we see that the posterior over C is a functional of L Ã I ðsÞ:
(a functional is a function of a function and its argument is put in square brackets). The form of U C depends on the task, as seen in the examples. Eq. (7) expresses that the likelihoods over the stimuli form the building blocks from which the posterior is constructed. When the normalized likelihood is parametrized by its moments,
for example x and r 2 when it is a one-dimensional Gaussian, then the posterior over class, p(C|I), will be a function of those moments, 
Model concepts
We can now formulate the following model concepts ( Fig. 3 ):
A probabilistic model is a model in which the trial-to-trial observations are stochastic when the presented stimulus and nuisance parameters are fixed, i.e., I is a random variable for given s and h. Due to variability in I, the estimate b C will also be a random variable, with a distribution given by Eq. (3). All signal detection theory and Bayesian models are probabilistic, but limited-capacity or high-threshold models are not (Green & Swets, 1966) . A Bayesian or optimal (observer) model (or model of optimal computation) is a model in which the observer's estimate of C minimizes the expected cost under the posterior distribution, p(C|I). A model of probabilistic computation is a probabilistic model in which the observer, on every trial, utilizes not only on a point estimate x of the stimulus to estimate C or decision confidence, but also at least one other parameter (higher moment) of the normalized stimulus likelihood L Ã I ðsÞ that is independent of that point estimate. If the normalized stimulus likelihood is Gaussian, this means that the observer utilizes trial-to-trial knowledge of (co)variance. A model in which the observer's estimates are functions of x only is not a model of probabilistic computation. The higher moments of the likelihood are collectively called uncertainty about the stimulus. Therefore, probabilistic computation requires the neural representation of uncertainty. It does not necessarily require the neural representation of the exact values of the normalized likelihood, which is why we avoid the term ''neural representation of probability".
These notions differ in the following ways. Many probabilistic models are neither optimal nor describe probabilistic computation, for example, a model with sensory noise in which the observer guesses randomly. It is possible for optimal computation to be non-probabilistic, and for probabilistic computation to be suboptimal. If an optimal observer performs MAP estimation but the MAP estimate only depends on x (and no decision confidence is estimated), the model is non-probabilistic, even though the posterior which the MAP estimate is derived from always depends on the full likelihood function (Eq. (7)). This happens in numerous tasks, including discrimination between two stimuli s A and s B (optimally done by comparing x to (s A + s B )/2), detection (similar to discrimination), and cue combination under equal likelihood widths (optimally done by an unweighted average of observations). In general, equal likelihood widths do not guarantee that the optimal estimator is non-probabilistic: in Eq. (6), even when r i is independent of i, the MAP estimate still depends on r i . On the other hand, not all probabilistic computation is optimal. For example, in cue combination, the estimatorŝ ¼
is probabilistic because it depends on r i , but it is not optimal (for a given cost function, there can only be one optimal estimator). To our knowledge, all models of probabilistic computation that have been found to describe human data best have also been models of optimal computation. However, this might be because of the tasks that have been studied so far and difficulty in finding appropriate suboptimal models.
An observer who uses a non-probabilistic estimator of C still performs probabilistic computation if a higher moment of the stimulus likelihood is utilized on a trial-to-trial basis to estimate confidence or certainty about the estimate of C. Decision confidence is relevant when the observer has to report it, as in a signal detection theory rating experiment (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) , or use it for behavioral output (Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009 ). In optimal inference, decision confidence can, for instance, be quantified using the variance or the entropy of the posterior distribution, p(C|I) (for a continuous variable C) or as the absolute value of the log posterior ratio (for a binary variable C). Since the posterior distribution depends on uncertainty about the stimulus, decision confidence does as well. When the observer's decision process does not use the optimal posterior distribution, it might still be possible to define decision confidence. For example, when he uses a wrong generative model, there is still a (wrong) posterior; when a decision variable is compared to a criterion, the distance between the two is a measure of confidence. However, in suboptimal observer models, confidence does not necessarily depend on stimulus uncertainty. For confidence estimation to be regarded as probabilistic computation, it must depend on stimulus uncertainty, and stimulus uncertainty must be independent of the stimulus estimate and unknown in advance to the observer.
In some cases, it is possible to approximate an optimal estimator that depends on stimulus uncertainty by a suboptimal estimator that does not. Several applications of signal detection theory to perception have considered such non-probabilistic, suboptimal estimators (Pelli, 1985) . A common example is the maximum-ofoutputs (or max) model of visual search (Eckstein, 1998; Eckstein, Thomas, Palmer, & Shimozaki, 2000; Green & Swets, 1966; Nolte & Jaarsma, 1966; Palmer et al., 2000) , which uses, in visual search with homogeneous distractors, the estimator b C ¼sgnðmax i x i À cÞ, where c is an arbitrary criterion. This max estimator is a reasonable approximation of the optimal estimator when the variances r 2 1 are equal and we are only interested in the receiver operating characteristic (ROC), rather than the specific value of the criterion c. (The ROC is swept out by varying the criterion along a continuum.) Although the max rule is not an optimal estimator, it has the advantage that the observer does not need to know r. Similarly, the signed-max rule (Baldassi & Verghese, 2002) , the sum rule (Baldassi & Burr, 2000; Graham, Kramer, & Yager, 1987; Green & Swets, 1966) , and the maximum-of-differences rule are suboptimal and non-probabilistic.
Evidence for a neural representation of uncertainty
The distinctions made in the previous section allow us to outline criteria which a psychophysics experiment should satisfy in order to provide evidence for probabilistic computation, and therefore for a neural representation of uncertainty. These criteria are: Behavioral data are best described by a model in which the observer makes his decision using independent higher moments of the normalized likelihood function (stimulus uncertainty), for example r 2 (I) in the Gaussian case. ''Best described by" can be made precise using Bayesian model comparison (MacKay, 2003) . The model does not need to be optimal. In the experiment, these higher moments are not known to the observer in advance. In practice, this means that (a) feedback during testing is absent or limited; (b) the observer is not trained extensively with feedback on the same values of nuisance parameters as are used in testing (Whiteley & Sahani, 2008) ; (c) preferably, the values of the nuisance parameters vary randomly from trial to trial instead of per block or not at all.
Consider an experiment in which the nuisance parameters h are fixed throughout an experiment and feedback is given on every trial during testing. Then, the observer would be able to gradually learn the values of the nuisance parameters and thus the higher moments of the normalized likelihood function L Ã I ðsÞ (this would be harder if the higher moments also depend on the stimulus itself, and the stimulus varies from trial to trial). Once this is accomplished, there is no need for the brain to maintain a trial-to-trial representation of L Ã I ðsÞ. Any subsequent computation would by definition be non-probabilistic. Therefore, a finding of near-optimality of a human observer in such an experiment would not provide evidence for a representation of uncertainty. In some signal detection theory and Bayesian studies (such as Jacobs, 1999; Kording et al., 2007; Palmer et al., 2000; Shimozaki et al., 2003; van Beers et al., 1996; Vincent et al., 2009) , nuisance parameters were fixed and could be learned by the observer. These studies might demonstrate that humans perform optimal computation, but not that uncertainty is encoded on each individual trial.
Although it is best to minimize feedback when the goal is to demonstrate probabilistic computation, a complete lack of feedback is not always feasible. Training is often necessary to familiarize the subject with the task or to make the subjects learn prior distributions (such as the class distributions p(s|C) in Example 1). Then, longer presentation times, higher contrasts etc. can be used in training than in testing. If feedback during testing is necessary, like when testing non-human primates, then it is advisable to use many different values of the nuisance parameters, so that it becomes harder to train on each individual one.
Neural representation of uncertainty: beyond single neurons
So far, we have described the observations, I, as unspecified sensory input. Now, we would like to represent I by a neural quantity, as a first step towards understanding how neurons implement probabilistic computation (Fig. 2b) . We limit ourselves to codes in which neural activity is measured by spike count or firing rate. The traditional view in systems neuroscience is that the firing rate of a single neuron represents the decision variable in a perceptual task. We argue that this view is limited to non-probabilistic computation (whether optimal or not), and that population codes are needed for probabilistic computation (whether optimal or not).
Standard view: one neuron fits all
The notion that single neurons are the key to the neural basis of perception has guided systems neuroscience at least since Barlow (Barlow, 1972) . As indicated in the opening quote, by using the firing rate of a single neuron as the decision variable, signal detection theory methods can be used to compare the discrimination performances of a single neuron and of the animal (Bradley et al., 1987; Britten et al., 1992; Newsome et al., 1989; Parker & Newsome, 1998) . The idea is that in binary decisions, there exists a one-toone correspondence between the activity of a single neuron on an individual trial, r, and the value of the of the log posterior ratio of the two alternatives, d from Eq. (5), on that trial. Neural activity is variable even when the same stimulus is presented repeatedly (Dean, 1981; Tolhurst, Movshon, & Dean, 1982) , and this variability would correspond to the variability in d induced by variability in sensory input, I. We examine two applications of this idea, to discrimination and visual search.
Example 4 (Discrimination with a single Gaussian neuron). An observer discriminates between two stimulus values, s A and s B . We denote the neuron's mean responses to these values by f(s A , h) and f(s B , h). Previous authors have modeled neural variability, for given nuisance parameters h, as Gaussian (Britten et al., 1992; Gold & Shadlen, 2001; Newsome et al., 1989) 
Optimal inference amounts to estimating that the stimulus is s A when r > (f(s A , h) + f(s B , h))/2. If h is fixed and known, or f does not depend on h, this single neuron will discriminate as well as the optimal observer, regardless of r neural .
Example 5 (Homogeneous visual search with single Gaussian neurons). In visual search with homogeneous distractors with a fixed value (Example 3), the observer has to report whether a target is present among N stimuli. If each stimulus is encoded by one neuron, the observer makes a decision on the basis of the spike counts {r i } of N neurons. All neurons are tuned identically, with their mean activity in response to the target higher than to the distractor. It has been proposed that, as in Example 4, r i corresponds to the noisy internal representation of a stimulus, and that the decision variable d = max i x i , discussed in Section 2.3, corresponds to taking the maximum activity across all neurons: d = max i r i (Verghese, 2001) . As mentioned there, this decision rule is close to optimal with respect to the ROC as long as nuisance parameters are identical for all stimuli and fixed across trials. These examples show that a single neuron per stimulus is capable of optimal or near-optimal inference, as long as the computation is non-probabilistic. Then, the only information the observer needs on a given trial is the maximum-likelihood estimate of the stimulus. Since this is a single number, it can be encoded by the firing rate of a single neuron.
Single neurons cannot perform probabilistic computation
When computation is probabilistic, the observer uses higher moments of the stimulus likelihood that are independent of a point estimate of the stimulus. Can this be realized with a single Gaussian neuron, as described in the previous section? We consider two cases for the nuisance parameters h: fixed or variable. If h is fixed and known with value h true , the stimulus likelihood is L r (s; h true ) = p(r|s; h true ). This will in general not be a Gaussian function (Fig. 4b and c) . The maximum-likelihood estimate is the solution of the equation f(s) = r, whereas higher moments depend on r and h true . Since the only free parameter is r, higher moments are either constant or functions of the maximum-likelihood estimate (Fig. 4d) . Therefore, it is impossible to encode stimulus uncertainty on a trial-to-trial basis as an independent variable, and computation cannot be probabilistic.
If, on the other hand, h varies from trial to trial (for example, the contrast of a bar whose orientation is of interest is chosen randomly from multiple values), or is fixed but unknown, the likelihood has two free parameters. Although in principle, two independent moments can be encoded, the value of one of the parameters, h, is not known so cannot be utilized. One could propose two solutions to this problem. The first is to estimate h on each trial through a separate mechanism, but this would require at least one additional neuron to encode that estimate. For example, in a study of decision-making, it has been proposed that time elapsed until the activity of an accumulator neuron reaches a decision termination bound can serve as a proxy of h (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009 ). This strategy seems only reliable in tasks that allow the integration of information over hundreds of milliseconds. Moreover, in general, substituting a point estimate of h is suboptimal, since h cannot be estimated with infinite precision. The other solution, which is optimal, is to marginalize h out in a way analogous to Eq. (1):
In this expression however, regardless of the form of p(h), the only free parameter left is r and the same argument can be made as when h is fixed and known. It follows that in neither solution, a single neuron is sufficient for probabilistic computation. This extends to estimation of decision confidence. In the discrimination task of Example 4, decision confidence can be quantified as the absolute value of the log likelihood ratio, and can therefore be computed from the activity of a single neuron. However, this is under the assumption that h is fixed and known.
This computation, because higher moments are either constant and do not need to be encoded, or are functions of the point estimate and are therefore not independent measures of stimulus uncertainty.
Marginalization is a problem for Gaussian population codes
Since a single neuron is inadequate for probabilistic computation, i.e., to encode and utilize uncertainty about the stimulus on a trial-by-trial basis, a code involving multiple neurons is called for. In cortex, many stimuli elicit activity in large populations of neurons, and multiple theoretical schemes have been proposed for how a population could encode uncertainty (Ma, Beck, & Pouget, 2008a; Pouget et al., 2003) . Here, we use the framework of probabilistic population coding, in which the stimulus likelihood is directly derived from neural variability in the same way as in Section 2, where we described the observations as sensory input.
Given the prominence of the single Gaussian neuron model for discrimination, a reasonable first try would be to consider a population of Gaussian neurons. We denote by f 1 (s, h) , . . . , f n (s, h) the tuning curves of the neurons in a population, and by r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ) a specific pattern of activity. The simplest assumption for the relationship between the neurons is that they are independent, although that is not necessary for the following argument. A population of independent neurons with Gaussian variability is described by the following conditional probability distribution: 
We think of this likelihood function as being encoded in the population.
2 The function has n parameters, r 1 to r n , thereby allowing for the encoding of stimulus uncertainty on a trial-by-trial basis. The number of neurons equals the number of independent moments that can be encoded: with two neurons, one can encode a mode or mean and a variance, with three neurons also skewness, with four neurons also kurtosis, etc. Therefore, a population of Gaussian neurons can, in principle, be used for probabilistic computation. However, there are several other problems with Eq. (11), that already exist in the single-neuron case of Eq. (10). First, the likelihood and therefore the uncertainty about the stimulus depend on the parameter prior, p(h). Second, a neural circuit must be able to compute the integral in Eq. (11). Finally, apart from any probabilistic considerations, the domain of a normally distributed variable is the entire real line, while neural activity is non-negative; this leads to inconsistency when the mean firing rate is low. These problems are reason to consider other forms of neural variability.
Gaussian neuron-antineuron system
In the context of a motion direction discrimination task, it has been proposed that a system of two uncorrelated neurons with Gaussian variability (and equal variances) implements the log likelihood ratio (Gold & Shadlen, 2001 ). This is a special case of the population of Gaussian neurons in the previous section. Let the stimulus values to be discriminated be s A and s B . The first neuron responds to these stimuli with mean activities f 1 (s A ) and f 1 (s B ). The mean responses of the other neuron are reversed, f 2 (s A ) = f 1 (s B ) and f 2 (s B ) = f 1 (s A ). If the nuisance parameters are known, the log likelihood ratio is 
When confidence is measured as the absolute value of the log likelihood ratio, it is then directly proportional to the absolute difference between the activities of the neuron and the antineuron. However, this is not probabilistic computation, since h is assumed known. If h is not known, it has to be marginalized over, as in Eq. (11) This expression is a lot less palatable than Eq. (12). This illustrates the problem with Gaussian (and in fact many other types of) variability: as long as the population contains at least two neurons, probabilistic computation is possible in principle, but difficult in practice because of the marginalization over h.
Poisson-like population codes solve the marginalization problem
The marginalization problem is solved if population variability is Poisson-like (Ma et al., 2006) , which is defined as pðrjs; hÞ ¼ uðr; hÞe
where u is an arbitrary function of r and h. This is a family of distributions characterized by a set of functions h(s), with one h i (s) belonging to each neuron in the population. These functions can be computed from the tuning curves of the neurons, f(s, h), and the covariance matrix of the population (Ma et al., 2006 
The key feature of this equation is that unlike in Eq. (11), the hdependent factors in the integral are separable from the s-dependent ones. As a consequence, the normalized likelihood when the nuisance parameters are marginalized out, L Ã r ðsÞ, is identical to the normalized likelihood when they are known, L Ã r ðs; hÞ. Specifically, the normalized likelihood is independent of the prior over nuisance parameters, p(h). Therefore, uncertainty about the stimulus can be estimated from the population activity r without knowledge of h. This is the most important benefit of Poisson-like variability.
Poisson-like variability is not the only form of variability that allows a separation of the s-and h-dependent factors in marginalizing over h. One could replace the neural activity r in the exponent in Eq. (13) by any function of r to achieve the same result. However, there are good reasons to use a linear function. First, it turns out to be consistent with the observed property of neural firing that its variance is approximately proportional to its mean (Ma et al., 2006) . Second, for the special case of independent Poisson variability, the function is linear (see Section 3.7). Third, the linearity allows for simple neural implementations of optimal cue combination (Ma et al., 2006) and optimal decision-making (Beck et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2006) .
Laplace approximation to the Poisson-like likelihood function
After normalization, the neural likelihood, Eq. (14), is close to a Gaussian distribution when the product of the number of neurons and the gain is sufficiently large (Figs. 1a and 5b) . When this product is lower, the likelihood may cease to look Gaussian but will typically still have a dominant peak that can be reasonably approximated by a Gaussian (Fig. 5b) . This is called the Laplace approximation (MacKay, 2003 
measures the uncertainty about the stimulus. It varies from trial to trial even when the nuisance parameters are fixed and known (Fig. 1a) . The approximate likelihood function, Eq. (17), is the neural equivalent of the more abstract expression in Eq. (2); the latter can be regarded as a Laplace approximation to a general likelihood function. If h(s) is quadratic, Eq. (17) is exact because the higher-order terms in the Taylor series, Eq. (16), vanish. Then, the neural and abstract likelihoods can be equated exactly; this gives
with aÁr = À1/(2r 2 ) (consistent with Eq. (18)) and bÁr = Àx/r 2 . The Laplace approximation will break down under high uncertainty, i.e., when the product of number of neurons and gain is very low.
Example: independent Poisson population
Independent Poisson variability is a special case of Poisson-like variability, in which the neurons are assumed conditionally independent. The distribution of activity is given by pðrjs; hÞ ¼ Y n j¼1 pðr j js; hÞ ¼ Y n j¼1 e Àf j ðs;hÞf j ðs;hÞ r j r j ! :
We now assume that the h-dependence is separable, i.e., where in the last step we have assumed that P j f j (s) = constant. This is approximately satisfied when the tuning curves are shifted versions of each other, and preferred orientations are equally and closely spaced. Again, L r (s) does not depend on the form of p(h). Here, h j (s) = log f j (s).
We further work out the case of equal-width Gaussian tuning curves. The tuning curve of the jth neuron is f j ðsÞ ¼ e , i.e., the uncertainty about the stimulus is determined by the width of the tuning curve and the total activity in the population. The variance is independent of the maximum-likelihood estimate, so the population activity encodes two independent numbers that vary from trial to trial and together specify the stimulus likelihood completely. Therefore, this population can be used for probabilistic computation. Since h(s) is quadratic, Eq. (17) is exact.
Optimal neural computation
In optimal computation, the posterior over C is a functional of the normalized stimulus likelihood (Eq. (7)). This posterior is now based on neural activity and we denote it p(C|r). If we adopt Poisson-like probabilistic population codes, Eq. (14), the neural equivalent of this expression is pðCjrÞ ¼ U C ½hðsÞ Á r; with U C a task-dependent functional. When h(s) is quadratic, as in Eq. (19), p(C|r) reduces to a function of aÁr and bÁr.
Example 6 (Discrimination). We return to Example 4, discrimination between s A and s B , but now based on Poisson-like population activity r. The log likelihood ratio is
where the last equality is just a notation. This shows that the optimal decision variable after marginalizing out the nuisance parameters is a linear combination of population activity. Confidence can be measured by the absolute value of DhÁr. In contrast to Example 4, no separate estimation of nuisance parameters is needed for either reporting decision confidence or optimal downstream computation.
Example 7 (Classification). We return to Example 1. Expressed in terms of neural activity, the likelihood of class is
The optimal decision variable is based on the log posterior ratio of the two classes, as in Eq. (4):
Thus, the optimal neural decision variable depends on the class distributions p(s|C). Discrimination (Example 6) is a trivial special case, 
where Dh ± = h(s A ± Ds) À h(s A ). In contrast to Example 6, this is a nonlinear function of population activity (Fig. 5c ).
Example 8 (Homogeneous visual search). In visual search with homogeneous distractors with a fixed value, the log likelihood ratio of target presence at the ith location is identical to the log likelihood ratio in discrimination (Example 6), Dh i Ár i . The global likelihood ratio of target presence is obtained by combining these quantities nonlinearly across locations according to Eq. (6):
This solves several problems associated with the single-neuron proposal (Example 5). Like the local log likelihood ratio, Dh i Ár i can take both positive and negative values. By contrast, a single neuron's spike count is only defined for positive values. Moreover, the local log likelihood ratio is linear in x i (Eq. (6)) and therefore follows an approximately Gaussian distribution (see Section 4.1). However, a single neuron has a spike count distribution that is closer to Poisson, with variance being proportional to the mean. A Poisson distribution is similar to a Gaussian only for large means. By contrast, Dh i Ár i is close to normally distributed when there are many neurons, in view of the central limit theorem, and its variance is not necessarily proportional to its mean. A neural network is said to perform optimal computation if it maps Poisson-like input activity r to output activity z, such that p(C|z) = p(C|r) = U C (h(s)Ár). Trivially, one might take z = r and the equation holds: every posterior distribution that the brain computes from a visual scene is already encoded in the retina. However, the purpose of computation is to reformat the input into a form that is easier to decode. Therefore, one has to impose a constraint on z. In previous work, we have required that the output activity is again a Poisson-like population code (Ma et al., 2006; Ma et al., 2008b) . For a binary variable C, this is equivalent to stating that the log likelihood ratio of C is linear in z: compare Eq. (20) ). Therefore, finding an optimal network amounts to finding z such that for some H(C),
One can find the types of operations r ? z needed in an optimal network by expanding the right-hand side for the task at hand under the assumption that h(s) is quadratic.
Signal detection theory with Poisson-like population codes
To conclude, we establish correspondences between signal detection variables and Poisson-like population quantities (see Table 1 ). Therefore, this section deals with binary variables C and optimal, but not necessarily probabilistic computation.
The MLE distribution
In Section 2, we described sensory input as an abstract quantity I, and noted that the maximum-likelihood of the stimulus and the variance of the normalized stimulus likelihood are functions of I (Eq. (2)). In the limit that I is highly informative about the stimulus, the maximum-likelihood estimate itself has an approximately Gaussian distribution across many trials, 
This is the well-known Gaussian assumption (Green & Swets, 1966) . It is related to but different from the assumption that the normalized likelihood of the stimulus is Gaussian, Eq. (2).
The variance r 2 MLE is computed as the inverse of Fisher information (Cover & Thomas, 1991; Paradiso, Carney, & Freeman, 1989; Seung & Sompolinsky, 1993 (Fig. 2c) .
At the neural level, our starting point is Eq. (15) for the maximum-likelihood estimate. In general, it is not possible to obtain a closed-form expression for x. However, a decent approximation is obtained by expanding the function h 0 (s)Ár about the true stimulus s true (Wu, Nakahara, & Amari, 2001 ):
and substituting s = x so that the left-hand side vanishes (since x is a maximum). The result is
This approximation is exact when h(s) is quadratic, since then the higher-order terms in Eq. (26) 
Sensitivity
The optimal choice between the alternatives C = 1 and C = À1 is based on the log posterior ratio d of Eqs. (5) and (21). The observer's performance can be derived from the distributions of d when the observations (I or r) are drawn from either class across many trials. These distributions are (in the neural version) given by the integral
(compare Eq. (3)), where
; which expresses that the observer performs maximum-likelihood estimation (an alternative is sampling from the posterior (Mamassian & Landy, 1998) ). An ROC is obtained from the distributions of d conditioned on I being drawn from one of both classes. Sensitivity, denoted d 0 , is well-defined if the distributions p(d|C) are approximately Gaussian for both values of C. This is true in the simple case of discrimination, Eq. (20). When well-defined, sensitivity is the difference between the mean values of d under both alternatives divided by the standard deviation of d. For discrimination at particular true values of the nuisance parameters, h true , the difference in means is DhÁ(f(s A , h true ) À f(s B , h true )). The average variance of DhÁr is Dh T (R(s A , h true ) + R(s B , h true ))Dh/2, where ''T" denotes transpose and R is the covariance matrix of the population. We find for sensitivity (compare (Johnson, 1980) For tasks more complex than discrimination, the distributions in Eq. (28) often have to be computed numerically, for example through Monte Carlo simulation.
Estimating Dh
Identifying the optimal decision variable with a neural population quantity is only of practical value if the latter can be computed from a population recording. If the recorded population activity on a given trial is r and variability is Poisson-like, we find from Eq. (20):
where K(x) = 1/(1 + exp(Àx)) is the logistic function. Estimating Dh from samples (s, r) is a logistic regression problem, which can be solved using standard techniques. Here, we use variational Bayesian logistic regression (VBLR) (Bishop, 2006) . We simulated 2500 trials by drawing population patterns of activity from an independent Poisson distribution. Fig. 6a shows the theoretical weights Dh (blue) along with the best VBLR estimate. We did the same for a simple correlated population (Fig. 6b) . Starting with a population Confidence rating: |d(I)| |d(r)| Decision variable in discrimination (Gaussian likelihood, flat prior)
of independent Poisson neurons, we applied a symmetric weight matrix W with a Gaussian profile of connection strengths; this was simply chosen as an illustration. The weighted sums Wr were used as rates for another set of Poisson processes. Neurons in the output layer became correlated due to shared input. The covariance structure is shown in Fig. 6c . The resulting population is approximately Poisson-like, with mean Wf(s) and covariance matrix R = diag(Wf(s)) + Wdiag(f(s))W, where diag(Á) indicates a diagonal matrix with the argument vector on the diagonal. Using this expression, we computed the optimal decision weights as Dh = R
À1
WDf. These are shown along with the VBLR estimate in Fig. 6d . The weights differ from the ones obtained if one would wrongly assume the neurons to be independent.
Once the weights Dh have been estimated, checks can be performed to determine how close the population is to being Poisson-like: generalization performance on a new data set (reconstructing s from r) should be high; Dh should not depend strongly on nuisance parameters like contrast; no nonlinear decoder should perform significantly better than the linear decoder Dh; and the relationship h 0 (s) = R
(s, h)f 0 (s, h) should hold, where R is the covariance matrix of the population (though this might be difficult to estimate in practice). Moreover, a population ROC can be obtained similarly to a single-neuron ROC, except that DhÁr is used instead of single-neuron activity. To do this, the proportion of activity patterns r elicited by s A for which DhÁr exceeds a given criterion c is plotted against the proportion of patterns elicited by s B that do so. Then, c is varied along the real line to sweep out a curve. Finally, once Dh has been estimated, Eq. (29) provides the posterior probability distribution over class on a trial-to-trial basis. This can be correlated with the value of a nuisance parameter that controls uncertainty, or with a behavioral measure of decision confidence.
Summary
In binary decisions usually studied in signal detection theory models, using a population of neurons with different tuning clearly leads to increased sensitivity compared to a single neuron (Eckstein, Peterson, Pham, & Droll, 2009 ). Here, we argue that population coding is necessary for a more important reason: to allow for any form of probabilistic computation. Taking the likelihood function over the stimulus as the central object, we made distinctions between probabilistic models, models of optimal computation, and models of probabilistic computation. Every model with sensory noise is a probabilistic model, but only in models of probabilistic computation, the observer uses a neural representation of uncertainty on a trial-by-trial basis. Referring to the opening quote, it is possible for an observer to be less than 100% correct on a task, due to noise, and still never encode uncertainty. While all signal detection theory models are probabilistic, some are not optimal and many are not models of probabilistic computation (including models for detection and discrimination, and max and sum models of visual search). In optimal computation, a posterior is computed, which always depends on the full likelihood function over the stimulus; however, for the MAP estimate, only a point estimate of the stimulus might suffice. Some signal detection theory models make suboptimal, non-probabilistic approximations to the optimal, probabilistic computation. We have proposed requirements for a psychophysics experiment to provide evidence for probabilistic computation.
Single-neuron coding is inadequate for probabilistic computation, because the latter requires that the brain encodes, on a trial-by-trial basis, at least two numbers for each stimulus, for example the maximum-likelihood estimate and the variance of the normalized likelihood function. Population coding allows to encode uncertainty on a single trial, and Poisson-like variability additionally solves the problem of marginalization over nuisance parameters, while being broadly consistent with observed statistics of neural firing.
Since generative models can be made arbitrarily complex, it is likely that perceptual tasks exist in which the brain has to make crude approximations to perform inference; this could lead to a suboptimal model describing behavioral data better than the optimal one (Landy, Goutcher, Trommershauser, & Mamassian, 2007) . However, we speculate that no task exists in which a suboptimal, non-probabilistic model outperforms an optimal, probabilistic one, because in realistic situations, taking into account uncertainty is a crucial element of good behavioral performance. This is a potential direction for future work. Another active field is the search for neural implementations of probabilistic optimal computation of the form of Eq. (23), both theoretically and experimentally. 
